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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
HEATHER RICHARDS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appellate Court No. 20080855 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the denial of a Motion to Suppress filed in accordance with 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12. The Defendant entered a Sery plea, (State v. 
Sery, 758 P.2d 935), in which her right to appeal the trial court's denial of her Motion to 
Suppress was reserved. The Defendant plead guilty to Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of UCA § 58-37-
8. The trial court accepted the Defendant's guilty plea and sentenced the Defendant to a 
stayed indeterminate term of imprisonment of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison 
and imposed one hundred twenty days in the Summit County Jail, stayed pending 
resolution of this action. The Defendant is not incarcerated and imposition of the jail 
sentence was stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. This Court has jurisdiction 
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pursuant to UCA § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUE OF APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DETERMINING 
THERE TO BE SUFFICIENT REASONABLE SUSPICION 
TO EXTEND THE DETENTION IN THIS MATTER 
BEYOND THE PURPOSE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP? 
Standard of Review: Challenges to suppression rulings present questions of law that this 
Court reviews for correctness. State v. Wilkinson, 197 P.3d 96, 616 citing Lavton Citv v. 
Oliver, 139 P.3d 281 ("We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for 
correctness, without deference to the trial court's application of the law to the facts."). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts -- Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A -- Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly 
and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;... 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:... 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third 
degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree 
felony; 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
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(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over:... 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 12. Motions. 
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, which, unless 
made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in accordance with this rule. A 
motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and 
the relief sought. A motion need not be accompanied by a memorandum unless required 
by the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Heather Richards was charged in the Third District Court of Summit County with 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony, 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Improper Usage of Lanes, and Following Another 
Vehicle Too Closely. The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress based on claim of an 
unjustified extension of the traffic stop. The Motion to Suppress was denied. The 
Defendant entered a Sery plea to the possession charge. The remaining charges were 
dismissed. Heather Richards is not currently incarcerated and timely filed a Notice of 
Appeal on October 14, 2008. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 8, 2007, The Defendant was operating a vehicle on 1-80 eastbound 
in Summit County, State of Utah. (R 54/6) Trooper Jason Jensen of the Utah Highway 
Patrol was on duty and observed the Defendant's vehicle drift over the fogline. (R 54/6) 
Trooper Jensen also observed the Defendant following another car too closely. (R 54/6) 
Trooper Jensen initiated a traffic stop. Upon contact, Trooper Jensen asked the 
Defendant to produce her driver's license and supporting documents. The Defendant did 
so. Trooper Jensen observed a spray bottle of Armor All, a can of Lysol, and a fast food 
sack on the passenger floor. (R 54/9) Trooper Jensen also observed two cellular phones 
on the passenger seat, a pocket atlas, and orange rinds. (R 54/9) Trooper Jensen also 
detected an odor of air fresheners. (R 54/9) Trooper Jensen ran the Defendant's license 
and registration for insurance and outstanding warrants. The car was properly registered, 
insured and there were no outstanding warrants. (R 55/8) Trooper Jensen returned to the 
Defendant's vehicle and gave her a warning for following too closely. (R 55/16) Trooper 
Jensen then questioned the Defendant as to whether she had any drugs in the vehicle or 
consumed any drugs and/or alcohol. (R 54/11) The Defendant responded "no" to all 
questions. (R 54/11) Trooper Jensen did not note any nervous or furtive behavior during 
the stop. (R 54/24,25) Trooper Jensen requested to search the vehicle; the Defendant 
refused. (R 54/11) Trooper Jensen stated that he was looking for a reason to search the 
vehicle. (R 55/9, R25 (video)). Trooper Jensen then indicated that he was going to run a 
drug dog around the car. (R 55/23) Trooper Jensen had his own drug dog in his vehicle, 
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but his dog was ineffective that evening. (R 55/30) The dog that was used for the drug 
sniff belonged to another police officer who arrived on the scene as back up. The dog 
indiciated on the trunk, and the trunk was searched. (R 55/12,13) Approximately 60 lbs 
of marijuana were located in the trunk. (R 55/15) Subsequent to the vehicle search, a 
pipe used to smoke marijuana was found on the Defendant's person. (R 55/16) Trooper 
Jensen charged the Defendant with Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to 
Distribute, UCA § 58-37-8, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, UCA § 58-37A-5, 
Improper Usage of Lanes UCA § 41-6A-710, and Following Another Vehicle Too 
Closely, UCA 41-6A-711. (R 001-003) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The purpose of the stop in this matter was for a traffic violation. (R 54/6,7) 
Trooper Jensen checked the registration, insurance and license and returned them to the 
Defendant and gave her a warning. (R 55/16,17) Trooper Jensen then extended the stop 
by asking a series of questions, as well as running a drug dog around the vehicle. (R 55/9-
11) Trooper Jensen lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the detention beyond that of a 
routine traffic stop. Because Trooper Jensen lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the 
stop beyond that of the traffic stop, when the traffic stop was concluded, any evidence 
gathered after the moment the traffic stop concluded should have been suppressed by the 
trial court. The trial court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; the Defendant believes 
the trial court erred in its ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
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DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DETERMINING 
THERE TO BE SUFFICIENT REASONABLE SUSPICION 
TO EXTEND THE DETENTION IN THIS MATTER 
BEYOND THE PURPOSE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP? 
In its Memorandum Decision dated May 21, 2008, the Court found that the traffic 
stop reached its conclusion when Trooper Jensen returned the Defendant's documents 
and issued a warning. (R 55/16,17) This Court is not required to make a determination 
when the traffic stop had ended; the trial court already made that determination. The 
Court also made a determination that the extension of the stop was not consensual and 
constituted a continued detention. (R 72,73). The sole issue squarely before this Court is 
whether the trial court erred in its determination that sufficient reasonable suspicion 
existed to extend the detention beyond the purpose of the original traffic stop. 
Trooper Jensen relied on the following facts in extending the detention: (1) he did 
not believe the Defendant's travel story; (2) a can of Armor All on the floor; (3) orange 
peels; (4) a can of Lysol on the floor; (5) fast food container(s) on the floor; (6) two 
cellular telephones; (7) a strong odor of air fresheners. (R 54/9) 
The trial court addressed most of the foregoing clues in its March 21, 2008 
Memorandum Decision. The Court dismissed Trooper Jensen's suspicion generated from 
the Defendant's story that her son did not like to fly. The Court stated that the story "is 
not a factor that adds anything, even in combination, with the other factors." (R 73) The 
trial court did not address the issue of the fast food containers. The Court briefly 
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addressed Trooper Jensen by noting that "some people, but probably few, have may have 
two cell phones." (R 74). 
The trial court focused most of its attention on the air fresheners. The trial court 
believed that the strong and overwhelming odor, caused by multiple sources, formed 
sufficient reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. (R 74) The trial court articulated its 
position concisely when it stated, "In combination and totality, the 'odor' factors 
amounted to reasonable suspicion to further detain defendant." (R 74). Yet, ironically, 
when asked whether he discovered the source of the overwhelmingly strong odor as a 
result of the search of the vehicle, Trooper Jensen responded, "I never reached that 
conclusion." (R 54/27,28) 
The Defendant believes that the statements of Trooper Jensen, both at the time of 
the stop and on the stand, are important in determining whether he had reasonable 
suspicion to extend the stop. The Trooper requested to search the Defendant's vehicle, to 
which she replied, "no." (R 54/11) In response to the refusal, Trooper Jensen stated that 
he was looking for a reason to search the car, implying that he had no reason at that time. 
(R 55/25 (video)) The Trooper's statement that he was looking for a reason is the best 
indicator that he did not have any reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle and that he 
was hoping that the Defendant would create it for him. 
Trooper Jensen's testimony conflicts with itself between the preliminary hearing 
in the case and the evidentiary hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. At the 
preliminary hearing, Trooper Jensen testified that at the time he returned Defendant's 
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driver's license and other documents to her, she was free to leave. (R 54/28) Trooper 
Jensen repeated the testimony at the suppression hearing stating, "Yes. Her stuff was 
returned to her. She could have left." (R 55/17). The Defendant believes his testimony 
establishes that at that moment, according to Trooper Jensen himself, he did not have any 
reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. Trooper Jensen then modified his testimony at 
the motion to suppress hearing by making the seemingly conflicting statement that, "she 
was free to leave, but I would not have let her go." (R 55/19) The Defendant believes 
this curious statement was to hedge against the trial court finding that continuation of the 
stop was not consensual. In other words, if the trial court found continuation of the stop 
to be non-consensual (which the trial court indeed found), then there was a fall back 
position of reasonable suspicion to continue the stop. The trial court put little emphasis 
on Trooper Jensen's testimony and statements, calling the inconsistent statements 
"irrelevant" because the determination of reasonable suspicion, "is an objective one for 
the court." (R 72) 
The Defendant respectfully disagrees with the trial court. While no specific case 
law on point exists, the Defendant believes Trooper Jensen's subjective belief and 
impressions at the time of the extension of the stop help create an appropriate context in 
which whether reasonable suspicion existed is determined. At the exact moment of the 
extension of the stop, Trooper Jensen was searching for a reason to search the vehicle but 
could find none and that the Defendant was free to go, according to his testimony given 
on two separate occasions. (R 54/28, R 55/17) Trooper Jensen's mind-set at that moment 
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took into consideration all of the factors previously stated, i.e. the two cell phones, the 
reason for travel, the fast food containers and the air fresheners. The Defendant submits 
that the foregoing fails to form any level of suspicion, much less reasonable suspicion. 
Nevertheless, the trial court based its finding of reasonable suspicion on a strong 
and overwhelming odor of a combination four air fresheners and thus the Defendant 
addresses those concerns. Air fresheners, coupled with other indicia of criminal activity, 
support a reasonable brief inquiry for puiposes of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. U.S. v. 
Alvarez, 68 F.3d 1242; U.S. v. Farias, 43 F.Supp 2d 1276; State v. Hechtle, 89 P.3d 185. 
However, the other indicia must be clear. Farias, at 1283. 
Case law exists that sheds light on what facts constitute indicia of criminal 
activity. Traveling at what may seem a suspicious time in a suspicious location alone is 
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (1991); 
State v.Truullo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (1987). Nervous behavior in the presence of police 
officers, alone, is also not enough. State v. Lovegreen, 829 P.2d 155, 158 (1992). The 
fact an individual previously has been involved in criminal activity is also not enough. 
State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (1993). Most on point in the present case is U.S. v. 
Farias, 43 F.Supp.2d 1276. In Farias, the question posed to the court was whether there 
was sufficient indicia of criminal activity to extend a detention. The officer observed the 
smell of several air fresheners, a road atlas, fast food wrappers, little luggage in the 
vehicle and a suspicious travel story. Farias, at 1282, 1283. The Farias court determined 
that insufficient indicia of criminal activity existed to warrant continuation of the 
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detention. Id at 1283. 
The question posed to this Court is whether indicia of criminal activity existed in 
this case to couple with the odor of air fresheners. In applying the above case law, 
Trooper Jensen did not observe: (1) suspicious travel; (2) suspicious location; (3) nervous 
behavior; (4) criminal history. Trooper Jensen did not observe any indications of drug or 
alcohol use. Trooper Jensen did observe a road atlas, fast food containers and what he 
believed was a suspicious travel story. However, the Farias court found that the 
foregoing does not constitute indicia of evidence. Id. 
Thus, the following question: what other observations did Trooper Jensen make 
that could constitute indicia of criminal activity? The answer is none; each and every 
observation made by Trooper Jensen was addressed in the cited cases. Trooper Jensen 
smelled air fresheners but without indicia of criminal activity beyond the presence of air 
fresheners, there is no reasonable suspicion upon which extension of the detention may 
be based. 
As such, once the purpose of the stop was completed, Trooper Jensen was required 
to allow the Defendant to proceed on her way. State v. Lopez, 873, P.2d 1127. Instead, 
he continued his questioning. In State v. Hansen, the officer questioned Hansen about 
whether he had alcohol, drugs, or weapons in his vehicle and asked if he could search his 
vehicle for these items. State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650. The Hansen officer conceded he 
had no reasonable suspicion of a further illegality to justify the additional questioning. 
Id at 653. The Hansen court held that since the scope of questioning exceeded, without 
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justification, the purpose of the initial traffic stop, the continued encounter was illegal 
unless some other circumstance justified the additional questioning. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Trooper Jensen had no reasonable suspicion justifying the extension of the 
detention in this case beyond that of a traffic stop. Once the purpose of the traffic stop 
was effectuated, which the trial court found it was when Trooper Jensen returned the 
Defendant's documents to her with a warning, Trooper Jensen was required to allow the 
Defendant to leave. Trooper Jensen extended the stop by asking additional questions and 
running a drug dog. The extension of the stop was unjustified and the evidence gathered 
from the moment the purpose of the traffic stop was effectuated should have been 
suppressed by the trial court. The trial court erred in denying the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress seeking to suppress all evidence gathered after the moment the purpose of the 
traffic stop was effectuated. 
DATED this ^ day of March, 2009 
THE STONE LAW FIRM 
Stone 
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this z 7 , ^ day of March, 2009, a copy of the 
foregoing was hand delivered to: Mark Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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Exhibit A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HEATHER M. RICHARDS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 071500331 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: May 21, 2008 
The above matter came before the court for decision on 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
BACKGROUND 
An information was filed on November 15, 2007, charging 
defendant with possession of a controlled substance, possession 
of drug paraphernalia and two traffic offenses, improper lane 
travel and following too close. After being bound over after a 
preliminary hearing on March 3, 2008, defendant filed a motion to 
suppress on March 26, 2008. An evidentiary hearing was held 
April 7, 2008, the court took the matter under advisement and 
allowed the parties to file further memoranda. Defendant filed a 
further memorandum May 2, 2008, the State filed its response May 
13, 2008. Oral argument was held May 19, 2008. The court took 
the issues under advisement. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Jason Jensen (Jensen) was on 
000067 
duty on November 8, 2007, at about 9:45 p.m. when he observed a 
vehicle on 1-80 traveling eastbound. The vehicle drifted over 
the "fog" line, or solid line marking the outside of the lane 
separating the roadway from the dirt shoulder. Then the vehicle 
drifted into the fast, or left lane, and it was following another 
vehicle at the distance of one car length in that fast lane. 
Based on those observations Jensen stopped the vehicle at about 
mile post 148 and approached the passenger side. The event was 
captured and is on a DVD which was introduced into evidence and 
which has been viewed by the court. Ex. 1. 
2. Defendant was the driver and sole occupant. Jensen asked 
for license and registration and defendant produced a California 
driver license and a registration in the name of another person. 
3. Jensen asked where defendant was going and she said to 
get her son in Minnesota as he did not like to fly after Jensen 
asked why she was not flying. Jensen saw a photo of a four or 
five year old child, in the console area of the vehicle, and 
believed that explanation to be fanciful as it was his belief 
that any young child would like to fly and he based that on his 
experience that his own children like to fly. 
4. During this interchange of documents and conversation 
Jensen saw a can of Armor-All on the floor, several orange peels 
lying about on the floor and partially in and out of containers, 
a can of Lysol and fast food items on the floor. He also saw two 
-2-
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cell phones and the vehicle had a strong, overwhelming odor of 
air fresheners. 
5. Jensen ran a documents check and the license was valid 
and there were no warrants for defendant. He returned to 
defendant and returned her documents to her. He gave her some 
instructions on not following too closely. 
6. Jensen then asked defendant if he could ask some 
questions and she said yes. Jensen did not tell defendant she 
was free to leave nor did she ask if she could leave. He was 
parked behind her and his emergency lights were still engaged. 
Another officer had arrived and could not be seen on the camera 
but his voice could be heard and thus the court finds that the 
second officer was thus out if his vehicle when Jensen returned 
to defendant's vehicle. That other trooper was parked behind 
Jensen. Jensen asked defendant if she had any prescription drugs 
or weapons or illegal substances, then asked if she had 
marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, or ecstacy and she 
said no. He asked if she used such substances and she said no. 
He asked if he could search her vehicle and she said no. He asked 
why not and she responded that he had no reason to search. Jensen 
stated he was going to have a dog run around the vehicle and if 
it indicated that would be probable cause to search the vehicle. 
He asked her to roll up her window. 
7. The other trooper, Cole Douglas (Douglas) who had arrived 
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at the scene was asked to get his dog out as Jensen's dog was not 
working well that night. In fact Jensen had his own service 
animal in his, Jensen's vehicle. Douglas "ran" his drug 
detection dog around the vehicle defendant was driving. The dog 
alerted on the trunk area and placed his nose on the rear license 
plate and scratched at the area. 
8. Jensen then went to defendant and defendant, who was on 
the cell phone at the time telling someone she was being asked to 
get out of her car, to get out and as she did so she dropped an 
object onto the ground, and it was a smoking pipe. Jensen asked 
what that was and defendant said she was trying to hide it. 
9. The troopers opened the trunk and found a large amount of 
marijuana, about 60 pounds. They first searched the interior of 
the vehicle. 
10. The -entire event, from the stop to the point the dog 
"hit" on the rear of the vehicle, took from 2143 hours to 2157 
hours, or 14 minutes. From the time Jensen returned the 
documents to defendant it was 4 minutes until the dog hit on the 
rear of defendant's vehicle according to the recording of the 
event. Thus, the claimed illegal detention in this case was the 
period of 4 minutes plus but under 5 minutes according to the 
recording. 
-4-
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DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Here the stop is not challenged and it was justified 
based on the driving pattern where defendant crossed over the fog 
line then followed another vehicle too closely. The actual search 
is not challenged and the only issue is whether there was 
sufficient objective suspicion to justify a detention beyond the 
traffic stop. 
2. As is the clear Utah law, as recently reflected in State 
v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, a seizure occurs if in view of all the 
circumstances a reasonable person would have believed he was not 
free to leave. The State bears the burden of proving the 
reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative 
detention. The officer may detain the driver to conduct a limited 
investigation of the circumstances that caused the detention. 
The detention, if it exceeds the reason for the original traffic 
stop, must be temporary and necessary and must be based on 
reasonable suspicion the officer can articulate. The court looks 
to the totality of the circumstances to determine if there is an 
objective basis for suspecting criminal activity and for a 
continued detention. 
3. Here, obviously, the officer stopped the vehicle for 
traffic violations and in the legitimate course of that 
investigation observed facts that, at least to the officer, 
yielded suspicion sufficient to justify a further detention. Of 
-5-
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course the legal question is not whether this officer believed 
there was sufficient basis for the detention, but it is an 
objective question. The traffic issues had been resolved by that 
time after the officer legitimately obtained her documents, ran 
checks, and engaged in brief contestation about defendant's 
destination and travel. That conversation did not delay the 
already lawful stop. The issue clearly then is whether those 
observations objectively, as opposed to subjectively, amount to 
reasonable suspicion to justify the continued detention. 
4. Further, as to defendant's concerns about Jensen's 
"contradictory" statements about whether defendant was or was not 
free to leave, those feelings and testimony of Jensen, 
respectfully to Jensen, irrelevant. It is again an objective 
standard. A person is not detained because the officer believes 
there is a detention or testifies there is a detention, nor is 
the person free to leave because the officer believes or 
testifies she is free to leave. That determination is an 
objective one for the court. 
5. Once Jensen returned the documents to defendant she was 
either free to leave or detained. The State does not contend this 
was a consensual encounter and it was not, despite Jensen's 
possible belief and testimony she may have been free to leave. If 
a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave 
the person was seized. Here, the court concludes there was a 
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continued seizure. The officer was talking to defendant, his 
emergency lights were on in back of defendant's vehicle, there 
was another officer present, the officer was asking about drugs 
being in the vehicle, and the court concludes it is a rare 
person, when an officer is talking through a window to a driver, 
who would believe they are free to leave. It is true defendant 
did not ask if she could leave, but all the factors indicate to 
the court that defendant, as an objectively reasonable person, 
would not feel free to leave. Jensen did not tell defendant she 
was free to leave. That is not, of course, required for this to 
be a consensual encounter, but it remains a factor. In total here 
there is no indication that a reasonable person would have felt 
free to leave, and so the court concludes defendant was in fact 
detained after Jensen returned the documents to her and continued 
to speak with her. 
6. Here, the factors observed by Jensen are frequent and 
recurring and fairly "standard." Jensen believed the travel 
plans made little sense because defendant stated her son, 
approximately age 5, did not like to fly. While that may be 
unusual, it is not of course by itself unreasonable. The court 
concludes it is not a legitimate factor that the court considers 
as it was and is based on Jensen's personal experiences. While 
it may have been suspicious to Jensen, it is not a factor that 
adds anything, even in combination, with the other factors. 
-7-
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7. Jensen observed many indications of odor masking agents. 
Not only was there an overwhelming odor of air fresheners, but a 
can of Lysol, a can of Armor All, orange peels, and other air 
fresheners. There were two cell phones. Again, none of those by 
themselves would amount to any level of reasonable suspicion 
because many people have an air freshener, for example. Some, 
but probably few, may have two cell phones. But, based on 
training and experience, the strong and overwhelming odor, caused 
by at least 4 different odor-producing agents that were present, 
could reasonably and objectively be seen as masking agents for 
the odor of drugs. That, to this court, is an objective set of 
circumstances that justified the officer in asking questions, 
that is, further detaining defendant. Given those objective 
indications of possible criminal activity often associated with 
controlled substances, the officer could temporarily detain 
defendant to quickly dispel or confirm those reasonable 
suspicions based on those articulated factors. 
8. The suspicion was not dispelled by the brief 
conversation, so the officer took the most rational step of 
asking for consent, to quickly dispel or confirm the suspicion. 
When that consent was refused, the office took the next 
reasonable step designed to quickly, at roadside with a mobile 
vehicle, dispel or justify and confirm his suspicion. That 
consisted of having a drug detection dog go around the vehicle 
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quickly. 
9. That dog alerted on the vehicle and that gave the 
officers probable cause to initiate the search of the vehicle and 
further detain defendant. Of course once the 60 pounds of 
marijuana was found, there was probable cause to arrest. Again, 
the actual arrest is not challenged except the basic claim it was 
the product of an unlawful detention. If the temporary detention 
was unlawful, there is certainly no attenuation and the arrest 
would be unlawful. 
10. In combination and totality, the xxodor" factors amounted 
to reasonable suspicion to further detain defendant. She was not 
free to leave but was seized temporarily but that temporary 
detention was justified by the articulated reasonable suspicion 
the officer 'had. Defendant was not detained beyond the traffic 
stop prior to Jensen's learning all of the above information. 
11. Again, there is no challenge to anything but the 
legality of the detention. The court has found and concludes 
there was a detention but it was lawful. 
The court DENIES the motion to suppress the results of the 
\ 
search. 
As noted in court, the matter is set for a status conference 
June 2, 2008. If the matter is to be set for trial at that time 
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defendant is to be present. If some further negotiations are to 
be undertaken defendant need not be present until either those 
negotiations are terminated and the matter is to be set for a 
change of plea or a trial. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED th 
r*1 J 
is ( day of l/s&u 2008 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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